approach to examining the effects of land use policies. In particular, the organization of government institutions, which affects the type of policies that get implemented and the consistency of regulation across metropolitan regions, often remains unrecognized. Working from this premise, the objectives of the article are threefold. First, the literature review brings together a large body of recent research examining the evolution of growth management programs and evidence of policies' effectiveness. Second, the review inductively develops an analytic framework establishing linkages between program implementation, land market processes, and land use outcomes. Third, the framework is used to derive a set of principles that may be used to inform future research. In addition to taking a more integrated approach, these principles suggest that future evaluations should draw on a consistent set of outcome measures, account for the determinants of metropolitan growth, and recognize the complex set of factors that lead to the adoption of growth management policies.
Following the introduction, the article is organized into five sections. The first provides an overview of regulatory growth management in the United States. The second examines the role of government institutions. The third section identifies the rationale for growth management and reviews empirical evaluations of land use regulation. The fourth presents the analytic framework and outlines its implications for future research. Finally, the article concludes with a summary of the research findings.
᭤ Regulatory Growth Management in the United States
The Evolution of Practice Two parallel paths trace the evolution of regulatory growth management programs in the United States (see Figure 1) . First, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, individual communities began developing policies in direct response to the pressures of rapid population growth and land development. Examples of early programs include the adequate-publicfacilities requirement of Ramapo, New York (1969) and the rate of growth programs implemented in Petaluma, California (1972) and Boulder, Colorado (1976) . Centered on quality-oflife issues, the emphasis of these and other local programs was on growth control or slow growth; they reflect the desire of individual communities to limit their participation in regional development patterns (Glickfield and Levine 1992; Landis 1992; Kelly 1993; Porter 1997 ).
Second, emerging at the same time, the so-called quiet revolution in land use policy initiated state involvement in local and regional planning efforts. With its roots in environmentalism, this movement sought extensive land use reform through a sharing of regulatory authority between state and local governments. This redistribution of power was targeted primarily at critical environmental areas and developments of regional impact, leading some to criticize state intervention as being unbalanced and overly restrictive of regionally beneficial growth (Fischel 1989) . Even still, early land use reform efforts succeeded in establishing a strong foundation for state-level involvement in regional planning and growth management (Popper 1988) . And by the end of the 1970s, several states had adopted comprehensive land use legislation, and many others had enacted more narrow mandates aimed at specific regions and environmental concerns (Healy and Rosenberg 1979; Popper 1981; DeGrove 1984) .
More recently, local growth control and state land use planning legislation have converged in the form of state-based growth management programs and regional planning organizations. After subsiding briefly in the early 1980s, state-level land use reforms went through a period of rapid expansion and have since been broadened to include a wide range of quality-of-life issues. As an extension, regional planning organizations have also expanded during the past decade. Although the actual degree of authority varies, federal policy (especially the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act [ISTEA] and subsequent Transportation Equity Act [TEA21]) and renewed state interest have served to broaden the powers of regional planning organizations considerably. The growth management programs implemented through these frameworks emphasize the links between local and regional concerns and are aimed at achieving a balance between the competing land use objectives of individual jurisdictions (Bollens 1992 (Bollens , 1993 Porter 1992; Orfield 1997) . In this way, contemporary growth management programs are qualitatively distinct from more narrowly conceived local growth control efforts. Most state and regional planning programs focus on containing urban sprawl but recognize the need to accommodate growth through coordinated, wellplanned land use (DeGrove 1992; Gale 1992; Nelson et al. 1995; Burby and May 1997; Porter 1997; Nelson and Peterman 2000) .
Program Implementation
Given this history, it is necessary to characterize growth management programs in at least two dimensions: institutional framework and regulatory technique(s). First, land use policies may flow from the state, regional, and local levels. But because specific regulations are typically carried out at the local level-even within statewide planning frameworks-the cohesiveness of government institutions has a significant impact on the outcome of growth management efforts. This issue is especially important in multijurisdictional metropolitan areas where political fragmentation produces a large number of locations subject to alternative combinations of land use constraints (Knaap 1998) . When communities fail to cooperate, the result is a "porous" land market where land developers and households are able to seek out areas that remain comparatively free from regulation (Landis 1992) . In this way, strict regulation at the local level often produces spillover effectsespecially increased growth and congestion-in adjacent communities (Fischel 1985 (Fischel , 1990 Kelly 1993; Downs 1994 Downs , 1999 . For example, there is significant evidence that locally enacted growth controls in the San Francisco Bay area displaced a large percentage of new residents between 1980 and 1990, leading to undesirable impacts on the spatial structure of the region as a whole (Shen 1996) . It is likely that this process has shaped many other regions as well because there is a strong relationship between metropolitan fragmentation and urban sprawl (Lewis 1996; Carruthers and Ulfarsson 2002) .
Second, growth management programs consist of policies aimed at controlling the location, quality, rate, and timing of new development (Porter 1997) . The most straightforward way of accomplishing this is through conventional zoning and subdivision regulations and the planning of capital improvements. But because these traditional mechanisms have often proved insufficient, a host of other, more innovative, mechanisms have been developed. Among the most common are adequate-public-facilities requirements, development permitting caps, development phasing programs, minimum and maximum density requirements, and urban growth boundaries (Godschalk and Brower 1989; Glickfield and Levine 1992; Knaap and Nelson 1992; Kelly 1993; Nelson et al. 1995 , Porter 1986 . More flexible nonregulatory techniques include development impact fees, open-space acquisition, performance standards, and the transfer of development rights (Mantell, Harper, and Propst 1990; DeGrove and Metzger 1991; Nelson et al. 1995; Porter 1996) . Most of these techniques were developed to correct for "imperfections" in land markets and/or to create new markets for such "intangible" commodities such as development rights.
The two-dimensional structure of growth management is important to recognize because the outcome of a particular program depends heavily on both characteristics, although the relationship is often transparent. State and regional policies are usually aimed at creating a more even regulatory landscape by setting standards and prescribing the use of specific policy instruments. Meanwhile, individual policies-implemented and enforced at the local level-act as the workhorses of growth management. This distinction has led researchers to focus on evaluations of specific techniques while giving little attention to the impact of the relevant institutional setting. In short, the level of government that growth management programs originate from makes a difference. The following section develops this idea further by contrasting local and extralocal growth management frameworks. The fourth section returns to individual regulatory techniques, first outlining the rationale behind growth management and then reviewing evidence of policies' effectiveness.
᭤ The Role of Government Institutions
Local Growth Management Programs Local efforts to manage growth have a long history of being savaged by critics for distorting real estate prices, creating exclusionary housing markets, and contributing to urban sprawl. Even still, it is important to recognize that local governments hold an important and enduring place in the growth management sphere because, as mentioned above, they are responsible for carrying out most forms of land use regulation. This authority has its roots in the federal government's 1928 Standard Zoning Enabling Act (Advisory Commission on Zoning 1928), which continues to serve as a model for most states' enabling legislation (Kelly 1993) . Through the police power, local governments are endowed with the ability to regulate
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land use and have traditionally had wide latitude to adopt and implement laws aimed at controlling growth and land development within their boundaries. As a result, local officials have become accustomed to thinking of these powers as being theirs by right (Porter 1997) , a perspective that is often mirrored by residents, who view their involvement in local land use issues as a form of political activism (Gottdiener and Neiman 1981; Deakin 1989) . These sentiments are reasonable given the U.S. system of home rule authority, but they give way to serious problems when parochialism is advanced in the name of growth management. The most common way that this occurs is through lowdensity zoning and other mechanisms, such as development permitting caps, aimed strictly at limiting the amount and/or pace of growth. On the surface, these policies espouse many of the basic principles that growth management seeks to promote, especially with respect to quality-of-life and publicfinance issues, but less worthy objectives often lie beneath. Local land use laws represent a "classic example of self regulation" (Altshuler and Gomes-Ibanez 1993, 10) , where the net benefits fall on the regulated parties-residents who gain from the enduring property values, quality public services, and other amenities that socioeconomic homogeneity helps to ensure. So, in many communities, the result of growth management has been a reduced supply of housing with respect to demand and an exclusionary real estate market that bars entry to low-income households and ethnic minorities (Fischel 1985; Niebanck 1989; Pendall 2000) .
These problems are compounded in large metropolitan areas where home rule contributes to urban sprawl by establishing low residential densities and creating inconsistencies between the land use plans of adjacent jurisdictions. While some communities freely cooperate with their neighbors, others may be unable-or unwilling-to address growth-related problems that extend beyond their borders (Bollens 1992) . Adding to the dilemma, when communities remain focused on their own well-being, they often adopt exclusionary land use policies in reaction to regionwide growth patterns (see Glickfield and Levine 1992) . Ultimately, such responses do little to manage growth but, instead, have been shown to spread development out by forcing it to other locations in the metropolitan area (Downs 1994; Shen 1996; Pendall 1999) . Even in the absence of parochialism, such undesirable outcomes can easily arise because of the mismatch between the scale of regulation (local) and impacts of growth (regional) that occurs under a decentralized system of growth management (Bollens 1993; Downs 1999) .
Finally, because local planning agendas tend to be narrowly focused, a clear distinction can be drawn between growth control and growth management. Although the two concepts are often used interchangeably, growth controls are measures aimed specifically at regulating the pace and amount of growth that takes place, generally at the local level. By way of contrast, growth management encompasses a broader perspective, recognizing the need to channel growth in a way that promotes compact development and minimizes its negative impacts (Nelson et al. 1995; Weitz 1999; Nelson and Peterman 2000) . But this is difficult to accomplish on a broad scale from the local level, so effective growth management increasingly involves extralocal implementation frameworks.
Extralocal Growth Management
Since the problems associated with local land use controls hinge largely on the scale at which planning takes place, extralocal frameworks, in the form of regional planning and state land use legislation, have emerged as fundamental mechanisms for implementing growth management agendas. The overarching purpose of these efforts is to reduce urban sprawl by promoting regulatory consistency and jurisdictional cooperation across metropolitan areas (Burby and May 1997) .
Toward this end, regional planning organizations, which serve nearly 90 percent of the nation's local governments, broaden the focus of planning activities by creating regional land use and transportation plans, providing local governments with technical assistance, and acting as forums for intergovernmental communication (National Association of Regional Councils [NARC] 2000) . For example, the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) produces a Regional Growth Management Strategy (adopted in 1990) that includes elements that coincide with local comprehensive plans. Although SANDAG has no preemptive authority over local governments, it has developed a self-certification process providing specific guidelines for helping communities ensure that their plans comply with regionwide land use objectives (SANDAG 2000) . Other notable examples of regional planning organizations include Portland, Oregon's Metro and Minneapolis-Saint Paul's Metropolitan Council, both of which have a substantive influence on local planning activities (Porter 1997) .
Meanwhile, a growing number of states have become involved in growth management through legislation mandating comprehensive standards and objectives for local planning activities. This involves spelling out specific elements required for land use plans and, often, prescribing the use of specific types of policy instruments that are carried out at the local level. In Florida, for example, communities use concurrency requirements to regulate the pace of their outward expansion; similarly, Oregon's program requires that all urban areas establish urban growth boundaries (Nelson et al. 1995) . A key feature of these and other contemporary statewide frameworks is that they seek to achieve a balance between growth-restricting and growth-accommodating policies (DeGrove 1992; Nelson and Peterman 2000) ; the central goal is to create a more even regulatory landscape by coordinating local governments' planning practices and responses to growth.
This objective is generally met through one of two models of implementation: conjoint or cooperative (Bollens 1992) . In a conjoint framework (such as those found in Florida, Oregon, and Washington), local governments are required by state law to prepare land use plans and are subject to strict penalties if their plans do not meet prescribed standards. In a more flexible cooperative framework (such as those found in Georgia, Maryland, and Vermont), planning is voluntary, and incentives are the primary means of ensuring that plans live up to prescribed standards. Both models are relatively new, only having come into widespread use during the mid-1980s, when they began to replace the more draconian regulatory, or preemptive, method of obtaining compliance from local governments. This approach had been met with considerable criticism for creating a "double veto" system where a proposed project could be dismissed, even if it had already been approved at the local level (Healy and Rosenberg 1979; Popper 1981; Fischel 1989; Bollens 1992) .
Evaluations reveal that state planning mandates have a substantive influence on local land use planning activities (Burby and May 1997) . But even within well-established frameworks, local inconsistencies remain a major problem because enforcement is a difficult and time-consuming task that grows increasingly complicated as mandates become more strict (Burby, May, and Paterson 1998; Deyle and Smith 1998) . Oregon, for example, specifically requires that all cities, counties, and regional planning authorities develop comprehensive plans that are consistent with statewide goals. Plans must be vertically consistent (between state, regional, and local levels) and, once completed, are subject to review and approval by the state Department of Land Conservation and Development (Knaap and Nelson 1992) . This has produced what is arguably the strongest planning framework in the country, but the process took twelve years to complete (Porter 1997) . In Georgia, where incentives encourage local governments to develop plans voluntarily, near-universal compliance was achieved in a much shorter amount of time. Vertical consistency is encouraged but not enforced, and, unlike Oregon, communities are not required to carry out their land use plans (Weitz 1999) . So, while Georgia's mandate is easier to meet and enforce, it is also weaker and may have a limited ability to produce its intended effects. What emerges, therefore, is a trade-off between the strength of the mandate and the complexity of enforcing it.
While research examining the effectiveness of growth management remains underdeveloped, existing evidence suggests that more rigorous frameworks may be worth the time and effort it takes to enforce them. The vast majority of this work focuses on Oregon, which has realized clear changes in land use patterns consistent with the expectations of growth management (Knaap and Nelson 1992) . Even though some cities have shown shortcomings relative to Oregon's expectations (see Weitz and Moore 1998) , the overall outcome has been more compact development patterns and the preservation of natural open space and resource lands (Nelson 1992; Kline and Alig 1999) . The effects have been particularly striking in Portland, where Metro, the nation's only directly elected regional government, has extensive control over land use and transportation planning. The organization also maintains the region's primary growth management mechanism-the urban growth boundary-ensuring that it remains at an appropriate scale for containing metropolitan growth. In short, Metro has been instrumental in promoting cohesiveness among local governments' planning efforts and is the reason that growth management performs better in Portland than anywhere else in the state (Lewis 1996) .
Given the difficulty of implementing any statewide planning framework, these findings illustrate that strict requirements are likely to be worthwhile, if controlling urban sprawl is truly a goal. Although Oregon's program has been timeconsuming and expensive, it has achieved a degree of success greater than any other in the country, making a strong case for fully committing to statewide growth management.
In sum, the organization of government institutions plays a significant role in shaping growth management activities. Local governments are fundamental to the process because they represent the outlet for land use regulation; however, left to their own devices, they can easily produce outcomes that are negative for metropolitan regions on the whole. This dichotomy raises important questions about how best to achieve effective growth management growth under the American system of land use governance. A response that continues to gain currency is for state and regional governments to play a stronger role in defining local planning practices. Far from stifling growth, these extralocal programs focus on the need to accommodate new development and have even been shown to promote economic expansion (Nelson and Peterman 2000) . While there is clear evidence that state land use legislation has a substantive impact on local plans, little is known about the eventual impact that mandates have on land use outcomes.
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Nearly all evaluations of growth management come from Oregon or from analyses focusing on individual techniques without explicit recognition of the relevant institutional setting.
᭤ Evidence of Policies' Effectiveness
Rationale for Land Use Regulation
The rationale behind land use regulation consists of three basic objectives: maintaining residential property values, shaping a compact urban form, and promoting efficient public service provision. It should be clear that these goals are interdependent (see Figure 2) ; for example, land value has a direct effect on urban density, which defines urban form and helps determine government expenditures on public services. These quality-of-life issues represent the fundamental motivation behind most growth management programs (Nelson et al. 1995; Ding, Knaap, and Hopkins 1999; Brueckner 2000) . They also represent the main criteria on which programs have been evaluated.
First, land use regulations are implemented with the expectation that they will raise real estate prices as they work to create more desirable communities. Specifically, they are intended to enhance property values by protecting against negative externalities such as congestion and incompatible land uses (Lee 1981; Lillydahl and Singell 1987; Pogodzinski and Sass 1994) . Increased prices therefore represent a desirable outcome of land use planning-an anticipated byproduct of regulation. Even so, there is some debate about whether this is a worthwhile planning goal; in many suburban communities, for example, land use controls are used to create monopolies that lower urban densities and exclude lowincome people (Fischel 1985; Landis 1986 ). On the other hand, increased land prices can be offset by dense multifamily housing developments (Miller 1986; Neibank 1989) . And since urban density is a direct function of land value (Alonso 1964) , removing restrictive zoning regulations can help to create opportunities for affordable housing while at the same time reducing urban sprawl (Knaap and Nelson 1992) .
Second, a compact urban form is viewed as beneficial because it increases regional equity, preserves outlying resource lands, and makes public transit possible (Downs 1994; Nelson et al. 1995; Ewing 1997; Orfield 1997) . Continuous, high-density urban development promotes equity because it helps to ensure that residents living in centralized areas do not bear disproportionate costs as public services are extended to remote developments in outlying areas. It can also reduce the effects of residential segregation-especially the so-called spatial mismatch-that has divided many metropolitan areas in recent decades. The latter two aspects are particularly significant because they are closely linked to the expansion of regional planning efforts during recent years. As high-capacity road networks are extended further into exurban areas, they expose large amounts of new land to development, depleting reserves of open space and farmland (Nelson 1992; Daniels 1999) . At the same time, the increased need to travel leads to greater automobile use and, ultimately, additional congestion in downtown areas (Downs 1992) . Public transportation can rarely help to relieve the problem since low densities do not support frequent service and rapid travel times.
Finally, for many public services, the cost per unit of development increases as densities decrease (Nelson et al. 1995; Porter 1997) . At issue here is the location of growth relative to existing development and capital facilities; since most facilities are immobile, the cost of provision varies from customer to customer, with the closest being the least expensive to serve (Frank 1989) . Far-flung development patterns therefore increase average costs due to the large investments required to extend roadways and other infrastructure that transmits water, wastewater, electricity, and other services long distances to reach relatively few numbers of people (Knaap and Nelson 1992; Kelly 1993) . For this reason, compact urban areas can be provided with high-quality services at relatively lower costs than scattered, low-density development. This relationship is explicitly recognized in Florida's statewide growth management program, which seeks to promote contiguous, highdensity development patterns through concurrency requirements (DeGrove 1992). In sum, land use regulations seek to strengthen real estate values, promote contiguous urban development, and ensure efficient provision of public services. If growth management has an impact, evidence of policies' effectiveness should be observed in residential property values, the spatial structure of metropolitan areas, and public service expenditures.
Price Effects
Land use and regulations are hypothesized to create price effects in two interconnected ways. First, as the rationale guiding their use suggests, regulations represent amenities that become capitalized into land values (Fischel 1985) . Second, land use regulations affect property values as supply constraints (Schwartz and Zorn 1988; Fischel 1990; Pogodzinski and Sass 1991) . Separating out the two types can be very difficult because, ultimately, the effect depends on the particular way a community-or region-chooses to manage its growth (Knaap 1991) .
Hedonic price models, which are used to attribute the value of multidimensional commodities to their component parts (Rosen 1974) , are the main method that has been used to test for the price effects of land use regulations. By using the price of a house as the dependent variable in a regression equation and its characteristics as independent variables, the implicit market value of each component can be estimated. A hedonic price model, therefore, takes the following form:
In this equation, lnP measures the natural log of the sales price of a house, and the β i s represent the percentage change in price accounted for by a unit change in each characteristic. For example, X 1 represents a vector of the house's physical characteristics, X 2 represents its locational characteristics and neighborhood attributes, X 3 represents the land use policies that it is subject to, and ε is the error term. This approach works well because individual land use regulations are operationalized as dummy variables, so there is no need to create synthetic measures to represent them within the model (Fischel 1990; Pogodzinski and Sass 1991; DiPasquali and Wheaton 1996; Knaap 1998) .
Analyses using hedonic price models confirm that land use policies have redistributive effects on residential property values. Regulations create amenities, raise the value of land and existing housing where development is permitted, and lower the value of land where development is prohibited or severely restricted (for thorough reviews, see Fischel 1990; Pogodzinski and Sass 1991) . Even so, it is important to recognize that the bulk of evidence on the price effects of "growth management" comes from analyses of local growth controls. Although findings are mixed, research suggests that these policies may have exclusionary consequences, displacing potential residents as they seek out the most affordable locations in the region, given their demands and budgetary constraints (Fischel 1985; Shen 1996; Pendall 1999; . But this outcome is directly linked to the decentralized practice of local growth control; it is inappropriate to extend the same set of expectations to policies that encompass a larger geographic scale.
The most systematic attempt to address a regional growth management policy in a hedonic price framework focuses on Oregon's urban growth boundaries (UGBs). In particular, Knaap and Nelson (1992) summarize research showing that, in addition to acting as supply constraints, UGBs influence property values as timing constraints and impose locationspecific effects. First, UGBs influence expectations about when land will be put to an urban use; the value of land outside is highly discounted because it will not be available for development until the boundary is expanded (Knaap 1985) . Second, UGBs impose location-specific price effects by raising the value of residential property located just inside the boundary. This occurs because the undevelopable land on the other side represents a significant amenity to homeowners-interpreted in the analysis as a greenbelt. At the same time, the value of farmland on the outside of the UGB is diminished because proximity to urban development is unfavorable to agriculturalists (Nelson 1986 (Nelson , 1992 . Ultimately, the regionwide effect of a UGB depends on how strictly it constrains the land market. If the boundary includes too much vacant land, the price effects will be minimal but, on the other hand, if it is drawn too tightly, it will create excessively high land values (Brueckner 2000) .
Together, these findings emphasize the importance of interpreting the price effects of land use and growth management policies within an appropriate conceptual framework. Moreover, researchers must be cautious because, even though hedonic price models are powerful for measuring correlation, they say little about the actual cause of the effects they capture (Knaap 1991) . The findings of the analyses reviewed here are significant because land market prices influence locational decisions and, by extension, the spatial structure of metropolitan areas.
Spatial Impacts
Analyses dealing with the spatial impacts of land use regulations examine policies' influence on the location of new development. Most of these analyses implicitly account for
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segmentation within regional land markets-an appropriate framework since, in many regions, suburbanization and economic restructuring have created a polycentric spatial structure with multiple employment centers located well outside of traditional central business districts (Garreau 1991; Anas, Arnott, and Small 1998) . Hedonic price models reveal that this transition is reflected in land markets. In the Los Angeles region, distance from the central business district has little or no effect on the value of residential property; instead, it is the surrounding urban subcenters that account for the locationspecific price effects once attributed to a single, centralized downtown area (Heikkila et al. 1989; Richardson et al. 1990 ). The presence of multidirectional land value gradients underscores the importance of accounting for differentiated land markets when evaluating the impact of land use regulations. They represent direct evidence of the locational freedom that households and firms enjoy in contemporary metropolitan areas. And because political fragmentation contributes to the segmentation of land markets, it is reasonable to expect that the cumulative effect of land use regulation has had a major impact on the spatial structure of metropolitan regions.
This principle is illustrated by way of research dealing with locally implemented growth controls in California. In particular, case studies (Landis 1986 (Landis , 1992 show that growth control policies affect population growth and housing prices inconsistently. Landis (1992) attributes this unevenness to the relative openness of the regional land market-the availability of locations subject to different combinations of land use regulations. Growth controls are most likely to raise the cost of housingand displace potential residents-when they act as barriers to entry for outside developers. This situation creates a monopolistic market that allows local developers to maximize their profits by raising prices; growth control communities will grow slowly, while residents unable to afford entry costs will be displaced to their non-growth-control counterparts.
These spatial consequences are revealed more explicitly through an analysis that accounts for the cumulative effects of local growth controls in the San Francisco Bay region. Using an econometric model that controls for employment, residential density, and development potential, Shen (1996) estimates that locally implemented policies displaced approximately 150,000 people, or 20 percent of the region's total population growth, during the 1980-90 time period. In other words, communities employing slow-growth policies-especially rate of growth programs and development permitting caps-successfully limited their population growth, shifting likely increases to jurisdictions located elsewhere in the region. Based in NIMBYism (not in my backyard), this decentralized system of growth management has led to a spatial outcome that is undesirable for the region as a whole (Shen 1996) .
Interregional analysis reinforces these findings. In a study of twenty-five metropolitan areas, Pendall (1999) shows that growth management's ability to limit urban sprawl depends on the combination of techniques employed by jurisdictions within the region. Policies used explicitly for growth control lead to significantly lower urban densities for regions on the whole than others, such as adequate-public-facilities requirements. In addition, the analysis reveals that farm productivity is a significant determinant of whether cities sprawl or not. The relative worth of resource lands affects urban growth because high productivity translates into a competitive market value, offsetting development pressures in outlying areas (Pendall 1999 ). This issue is important because, even in the absence of political fragmentation, growth management must contend with the differences between urban and resource land markets.
In Oregon, where urban growth boundaries separate urban and rural land, analyses have focused on evaluating growth management's ability to restrain urban sprawl and preserve outlying resource areas. Knaap and Nelson (1992) document that regional UGBs promote cohesiveness through the political processes necessary to establish them. Even so, in Oregon, UGBs alone have a limited ability to manage growth; while most urban development remains inside of the boundaries, overall densities are much lower than planned, and development often exhibits patterns characteristic of sprawl (Knaap and Nelson 1992; Weitz and Moore 1998) . Using a probit model to simulate land market processes, Kline and Alig (1999) confirm that lands located within UGBs and subject to state-approved land use plans are more likely to be developed than those that are not. They find some evidence that development has "leaked" out of the UGB but remain optimistic about its ability to restrain sprawl. In short, all three of the Oregon analyses agree that urban growth boundaries are a worthwhile regulatory practice, with the caution that other techniques may be required to achieve desired objectives.
Collectively, the evaluations reviewed here provide strong evidence in favor of centralized regulatory frameworks. A decentralized approach to growth management creates spatially segmented land markets and promotes urban sprawl. Although location-specific amenities, proximity to employment centers, housing quality, and other factors will always conspire to differentiate land markets (Feitelson 1993) , a more uniform regulatory landscape limits the role that the public sector plays in the process. In short, if maintaining a compact urban form is a goal, growth management efforts should seek to promote political cohesiveness and regulatory consistency across metropolitan regions.
The Economics of Public Services
At the heart of the debate over growth management lies the question of whether or not land use regulation produces a net benefit for the public at large. If not, some argue, growth management unnecessarily interferes with processes better left to the land market (Richardson and Gordon 1993) . On the other hand, if the social and economic benefits that policies promise are realized, regulation of the land market is justified (Lee 1981) . The tension between these two perspectives is longstanding, and there is a clear need to weigh costs and benefits of policies when evaluating growth management programs (see, e.g., Ewing 1997; Gordon and Richardson 1997) . But the relationship between land market processes and government regulation is complex, and it is nearly impossible for a single analysis to account for all of the relevant costs and benefits (Fischel 1990) .
As a result, many evaluations focus on more narrow questions relating to the connections between urban form and government expenditures on public services. This approach is reasonable because it remains practical while at the same time responding to important questions regarding the benefits of growth management. In particular, research dealing with the economics of public services focuses on how the planning of capital facilities affects development patterns, whether development impact fees are a worthwhile growth management mechanism, and the relationship between urban density and public-service expenditures.
First, hedonic price models show that the presence of infrastructure raises the value of unimproved land (Knaap 1985; Knaap and Nelson 1992) . In Salem, Oregon, adjacent water and sewer mains accounted for nearly $2,000 of the total property value at the time the research was conducted (Nelson 1986) . Increased real estate prices indicate that public services are an important factor in shaping the location and pattern of regional development; since infrastructure is a valued asset, growth is more likely to occur in the presence of existing capacity than locations requiring new facilities to be built. From the standpoint of public finance, these price effects are especially important because they reveal the redistributive effects of capital-facilities planning. Since the property taxes of established residents pay for new infrastructure investments, the resulting income transfer reinforces concerns about the equity of government-subsidized suburban development-especially if it is more expensive to support than comparatively compact development patterns (Orfield 1997) .
Second, development impact fees, or adequate-publicfacilities requirements, are one of the most common growth management techniques (Kelly 1993; Nelson et al. 1995; Porter 1997) . Acknowledging the costs of growth, these regulations shift some or all of the expense of new infrastructure to the private sector. In a study of twenty-nine communities located in DuPage County, Illinois, Skidmore and Peddle (1998) report that during a sixteen-year time period, development impact fees reduced the rate of growth by more than 25 percent. The analysis concludes that impact fees are likely to increase urban densities by forcing builders to more carefully consider the costs of dispersed growth (Skidmore and Peddle 1998) . Pendall (1999) advances additional evidence of this, finding that development impact fees lead to greater densities in metropolitan areas where they are implemented. Still, the overall impact depends on consistency; impact fees have a limited effect on urban sprawl in regions where few communities employ them compared with regions where many do (Pendall 1999) .
Finally, even if high densities are achieved-through impact fees or otherwise-the relationship between compact development and public expenditures remains unclear. On one hand, support for high densities is found in evidence that development is significantly more expensive to accommodate at suburban densities (Frank 1989) and that public indebtedness is positively correlated with urban sprawl (Pendall 1999 ). This suggests that growth management policies may produce direct benefits by controlling urban sprawl and reducing government outlays for infrastructure and other services. On the other hand, a more moderate perspective cites evidence that the aggregate price of public services bears a U-shaped relationship to urban density. In particular, Ladd (1992 Ladd ( , 1998 shows that spending on public services at first declines as density increases but then increases sharply-the cost of services in very dense counties is estimated to exceed the minimum by up to 43 percent. These findings lend only weak support to planners' claims that high densities are necessary for efficient provision of public services; the U-shaped relationship implies that if densities become too high, development will place an excessive burden on public coffers.
To reconcile these mixed conclusions, it is helpful to consider the difference between intermediate and final outputs (Ewing 1997) . The final outputs measured by Ladd (1992 Ladd ( , 1998 include services, such as police and fire protection, in addition to physical infrastructure, which is considered an intermediate output. And since capital facilities require large initial investments, marginal costs are much lower than average costs-infrastructure is often paid for before it is needed, while services are not expanded until more are required. Moreover, because of their greater land values, high-density
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areas yield greater property taxes than low-density areas, enabling the development to pay for the final outputs that it demands (Ewing 1997) . In sum, capital facilities raise property values and "pave the way" for development. The costs of new development may be at least partially offset through impact fees, which have also been found to encourage greater urban densities. Even so, the relationship between urban form and public spending remains unclear; ultimately; the debate hinges on how expenditures are measured (Frank 1989) . In any case, further investigation is needed to uncover the links between growth management practices and the economics of public services.
᭤ Analytic Framework and Discussion
Working from the literature review, this section presents a conceptual model for evaluating the effectiveness of regulatory growth management programs. The model is inductiveits purpose is to integrate the existing body of knowledge into a coherent framework for examining the outcome of land use regulation. The relationships that it identifies flow directly from the planning literature and point to several principles that may be used to guide future research.
Conceptual Model
Three interconnected factors weigh on the effectiveness of growth management programs. First, programs are composed of individual policies that have been designed to fulfill a wide variety of land use objectives. Since many of these are complimentary, the outcome depends on whether the particular combination of techniques employed is well suited for accomplishing desired objectives. Second, the effectiveness of growth management is strongly influenced by the institutional setting in which policies are implemented. Political fragmentation undermines programs' ability to produce their intended outcomes but, as described in the section on extralocal growth management, state and regional planning frameworks can help to improve this by fostering intergovernmental communication and consistency among local land use plans. Finally, the effects of program design and institutional structure converge through the mediating influences of regional land markets. Land markets are the keystone of the process because they represent the medium through which the locational decisions of producers (land developers) and consumers (households) shape metropolitan spatial structure. Together with demand factors, the supply constraints imposed by land use regulations are a major force in determining the outcome of regional development.
The effects of growth management can be observed through the price effects created by land use regulations, the spatial structure of metropolitan areas, and expenditures on public services. First, price effects emerge as land use policies become capitalized into land and housing values-either by creating benefits or denying development opportunities. Second, the spatial structure of metropolitan areas is observed in two dimensions: residential density and total urbanized land area. These outcomes are particularly important because they are direct indicators of the degree to which metropolitan areas sprawl. Finally, public service expenditures are tied to urban form and, by extension, the policies used to shape it. Their role in the process of shaping regional development is not well understood and merits careful investigation. Collectively, these outcome measures speak to the fundamental rationale behind land use regulation and represent worthwhile markers for evaluating the effectiveness of growth management programs.
The conceptual model is presented formally in Figure 3 . The figure illustrates that the relationship between program implementation and land use outcomes is straightforward. First, growth management programs are defined by a set of policies and an institutional framework, characterized by the relationship between state, regional, and local land use authorities. Together, these two elements represent program implementation, but they act as separate inputs into the regional land market. The distinction is important because the same combination of policies is likely to produce different results
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Carruthers under an alternative institutional arrangement, that is, depending on whether state and regional authorities play a role in shaping local land use planning activities. Second, land developers and households respond via the regional land market, which is shaped by supply and demand factors. From the standpoint of planning, this stage represents a large "black box," because there is little concrete evidence of how growth management programs interact with land markets to produce their final effects. Nevertheless, substantive outcomesobserved as price effects, urban density, urbanized land area, and public service expenditures-ensue. Finally, through program evaluation, these outcomes inform future planning processes as policy makers respond in an ongoing effort to guide regional development processes.
Each individual element of the conceptual model characterizes either the structure or outcome of a growth management program. But none of these should stand alone as an indicator of program quality or performance; instead, the framework represents a basis for examining the place-to-place differences that arise from local, regional, and state growth management efforts. The question it poses, therefore, is whether outcomes vary along with policies, institutional structure, and land market characteristics.
Principles for Future Research
The analytic framework points to several principles that may be used to inform future research evaluating the effectiveness of growth management programs. The common theme among them is that there is a need for a more unified research strategy built on systematic analyses that produce generalizable results.
Principle 1: Account for the appropriate combination of intervening variables during theory and hypothesis development. The main premise of the analytic framework is that the outcome of growth management is shaped by several interconnected factors including the combination of policies employed, the institutional framework through which they are implemented, and the mediating influences of regional land markets. Most evaluations account for at least one of these elements but rarely deal with all three at once. For example, analyses often focus on the relationship between policies and land markets while neglecting the relevant institutional setting. But research examining the role of government institutions shows that they have a significant impact on the type of policies that get implemented and the consistency of regulation across metropolitan regions-this relationship is indicated by the line marked Regulatory Consistency in Figure 3 (Lewis 1996; Burby and May 1997) . Analyses that fail to control for this influence are likely to produce misleading results; case studies may misattribute the effects of policies, and econometric analyses will almost certainly suffer from an omitted variable bias. For this reason, analysts seeking to develop and test hypotheses regarding the impact of growth management should carefully consider the set of relationships that influences program success. A more holistic approach will add to theories' explanatory power; produce more realistic results; and, ideally, reach conclusions that are generalizable to other cases.
Principle 2: Focus on a consistent set of interdependent outcome measures. The lack of an agreed-upon set of outcome measures is a significant drag on the planning discipline's understanding of growth management (Godschalk and Brower 1989; Blanco 1998) . But this problem may not be as severe as it seems; in one way or another, each of the analyses reviewed in the section dealing with evidence of policies' effectiveness centers on land use policies' price effects, spatial impacts, and/or relationship to the economics of public services. The conceptual model (Figure 3 ) extends this finding, suggesting that residential property values, residential density, urbanized land area, and public service expenditures represent reasonable proxies for the three types of outcomes. These measures flow directly from the rationale underpinning land use planning and are well suited for both qualitative and quantitative research. By employing a more consistent set of outcome measures, analyses will produce results that are easier to compare to the findings of others.
But like the factors influencing them, residential property values, residential density, urbanized land area, and public service expenditures should not be examined in isolation. In applied settings, planners recognize the connections between the four and often regulate one in an effort to influence the others (see Figure 2) . Moreover, accounting for multiple outcomes provides a mechanism for examining the effects of alternative growth management policies and regulatory frameworks within the larger context of planners' motivations. In other words, it is a way of examining the effectiveness of growth management while accounting for each of several factors that planning is meant to affect. Ultimately, this is more realistic than drawing conclusions based on one particular outcome of land use regulation such as urban density. If these relationships-which may vary from place to place-exist and they remain unrecognized, analyses are likely to suffer from an omitted and/or endogenous variable bias.
Principle 3: Account for the determinants of metropolitan growth. The conceptual model indicates that little is known about how growth management programs interact with regional land markets to produce their final effects. Like all markets, the land market is shaped by supply and demand factors, but research suggests that the latter-including population and
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income growth-is likely to be more important for shaping metropolitan housing prices (Potepan 1996) . One way of capturing the effects of demand is to account for the determinants of metropolitan population and/or employment growth. But there are at least two relevant issues here. First, a recent body of research focuses on determining whether employment growth follows population growth or the other way around (Carlino and Mills 1987; Bornet 1994; Clark and Murphy 1996; Mulligan, Vias, and Glavac 1999) . The relationship may also be bidirectional; in truth, it probably differs between metropolitan areas. Second, industrial mix has a significant impact on metropolitan areas' population and income growth (Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer 1995; Drennan 1999) . In particular, a large concentration of manufacturing industries slows growth, while a specialization in high-tech industries provides a boost. Both issues are important because they speak to the underlying causes of growth and, by extension, the characteristics of demand for residential development (DiPasquali and Wheaton 1996) . It is important to account for these factors to disentangle the effects of growth management and growth. This is especially true if price effects, urban spatial structure, and public service expenditures continue to be used as markers because they are directly linked to the characteristics of demand.
Principle 4: Recognize the complex set of factors that lead to the implementation of growth management policies. One shortcoming of the conceptual model is that it does not explicitly address the underlying motivations that determine the presence of growth management policies. As outlined above, land use regulations are expected to raise property values by protecting against negative externalities and incompatible land uses. However, the relationship may not always be so straightforward; in particular, research suggests that local growth control policies are often adopted for exclusionary purposes (Deakin 1989; Fischel 1990) . If this is the case, it is likely that land use regulations "follow the market," leading to an "endogenous zoning effect," where policies have little effect on real estate prices because they work to maintain-rather than raiseproperty values (Pogodzinski and Sass 1991, 1994) . Moreover, because policies are often complementary, the presence of one may be tied to the presence of another. Ultimately, whether or not the endogeneity of land use regulation extends to state and regional planning initiatives remains unclear. The issue is raised here to point out the need for research aimed at uncovering the range of factors that lead to the implementation of growth management programs and the relationships between complementary land use policies.
Principle 5: Acknowledge the limitations of conceptual models in the absence of empirical analysis. The final principle hinges on how the analytic framework is interpreted and used to inform the practice of growth management. Many readers may point out that the conceptual model (Figure 3 ) and the variables it suggests are gross simplifications of something as complex as growth management; the author wholeheartedly agrees. Planning is a normative discipline, responsible for developing policies that shape metropolitan areas into what they "ought to be," and many land use regulations have evolved because they represent the most practical way of achieving desired outcomes. Urban growth boundaries are a good example. Recognizing the relationships between the supply of developable land, urban form, and public service expenditures, growth boundaries represent a theoretically sound method of managing development (Ding, Knaap, and Hopkins 1999) . Even so, in the absence of empirical analysis, there is very little evidence that these relationships consistently hold true. The purpose of the conceptual model, therefore, is to simplify "real-world" processes in a way that enables empirical analyses to respond directly to the objectives of land use and growth management policies. Only after rigorous testing should the implied relationships be used to guide actual planning processes.
᭤ Summary and Conclusion
Working from a review of recent empirical research, this article developed an analytic framework for evaluating the effectiveness of regulatory growth management programs. First, the literature review revealed that, despite the disembodied structure of scholarly research on the topic, evaluations of growth management have followed a relatively straightforward path. Empirical research shows that the organization of government institutions affects the consistency of land use regulation across metropolitan areas and that the impact of land use policies is revealed through their price effects, spatial impacts, and relationship to the economics of public services. Second, these findings were used to develop an inductive conceptual model establishing relationships between program implementation, land market processes, and four measurable land use outcomes-property values, urban density, urbanized land area, and public service expenditures. Finally, the analytic framework was used to derive several principles for future evaluations of growth management programs. These principles suggest that research should seek to adopt an integrated approach to theory and hypothesis development, draw on a consistent set of outcome measures, account for the determinants of metropolitan growth, and recognize the complex set of factors that lead to the adoption of growth management policies.
More than ten years have passed since the so-called second wave of land use regulation initiated widespread expansion of state and regional land use planning frameworks. As growth management continues to gain currency, it is important that the planning discipline respond by developing a more unified knowledge base of programs' impact on land use outcomes.
While it remains to be tested through empirical analysis, the conceptual model presented in this article represents a positive step toward this end. 
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